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require a much more expanded view than has even been attempted
here. It has practical bearings of sufficient interest and importance to the business community to attract the attention of those
whose business it is to settle and adjust questions of difficulty as
they arise.
E. W.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.
EDWARD RIDDLE v. HARRY STEVENS AND OTHERS.
An indorsement in blank by a third person of a note, negotiable or non-negotiable,
implies a warranty that the note when due will be collectible by due diligence.
This implication is, however, only primd facie, and will yield to proof of the
real character of the contract.
Notes so indorsed, however, have not the sanctity of ordinary negotiable paper,
and do not fall within the rules of the law-merchant; any person taking them
therefore is put upon inquiry as to the real character of the contract.
Where, therefore, a blank negotiable note was indorsed by a party who supposed
that his name had been or would be inserted as payee, and upon an understanding
with the maker that the note should be used for a particular purpose, and the
maker, without the knowledge of the indorser, filled it up by inserting the name
of another person as payee, and such payee, with no knowledge of the facts, tock
the note for a valuable consideration, but for a different purpose from that intefided
by the indorser, it was ield that the payee could not recover against the indoiser.
[Two judges disseilting.]

Assumpsit, charging the defendants in one count as ordinary
indorsers of a promissory note, and in another as indorsers, as
third persons, of a note payable to the order of the plaintiff;
alleging in the latter that the defendants, by their indorsement
of the note in blank, promised that the note was due and payable
according to its tenor and that the same should be collectible
upon due diligence when it should come to maturity, that the
note was not paid by the maker at maturity, and that the maker
was then and had ever since remained insolvent, and that the
note could not have been collected of him. The case was
tried by the jury in the superior court, on the general issue, with
notice, before PHELPS, J.
On the trial the plaintiff offered in evidence the following note,
which was admitted to be a renewal of a former note not in
dorsed by the defendants:-
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"1New York, June 19, 1861.
"$218.59.
"1Three months after date I promise to pay to the order of E.
Riddle Two Hundred Eighteen and 5 dollars, at my office
WM. L. McDoNALD."
Value received.
Indorsed as follows:
"H. STEVENS & Co."
" EDWARD RIDDLE."

The defendants objected to the admission of the note in evidence under either count in the declaration, but the court overruled the objection. The plaintiff claimed, and offered evidence
to prove, that McDonald, the maker of the note, in June 1861,
was indebted to him by a note previously given, of about the
same amount as the one declared on, which matured on the 19th
day of that month, and that he was unable to pay it at maturity,
and applied by letter to the plaintiff for a renewal of the same,
and that the plaintiff replied that he would renew the note, but
should require McDonald to procure an indorser to the renewal
note, and that he soon afterwards received from McDonald the
note above described, with the defendants' indorsement in blank
upon it; to which evidence the defendants objected, but the court
overruled the objection. The plaintiff further claimed, and offered
evidence to prove, that he had no knowledge of the defendants or
of their place of residence or business, until after the maturity
of the note, and that he indorsed the same in blank under the
name of the defendants, and procured it to be discounted; that
when it became due it was dishonored by the maker, and notices
of such dishonor regularly prepared by a notary, and those designed for both the plaintiff and defendants forwarded by mail to
the plaintiff at his residence in the city of Boston ; that he thereupon took up the note, and wrote to McDonald to ascertain the
residence or place of business of the defendants, but received no
answer; that he soon afterwards went to the city of New York,
and then for the first time ascertained that the defendants' residence and place of business was at Naugatuck, Connecticut, and
that some ten or twelve days after receiving such information he
wrote the defendants a letter informing them of the dishonor of
the note. The plaintiff claimed further, and offered evidence to
prove, that at the maturity of the note McDonald had become
utterly insolvent, and had absconded, and that under the laws of
the state of New York, where he last resided and had carried on

RIDDLE v. STEVENS.

business, no attachment upon original process could have been
issued against and levied upon his property; and claimed that
under the circumstances he was under no obligation to make an
effort to secure or collect the note from him, and in not having
done so was guilty of no default that would operate to discharg6
the defendants from their liability. The defendants claimed,
and offered evidence to prove, that at the time the note matured,
and for several weeks afterwards, McDonald was not insolvent,
but was in possession of a large amount of personal property in
the city of New York, which he would have turned over to the
plaintiff in payment of the note if he had been requested, and
that he had not absconded, and if he had, his property might
have been attached and the note thereby secured; and claimed
that the plaintiff's neglect to make an effort to collect the note
from McDonald discharged the defendants, if they had been
otherwise liable to the plaintiff. The defendants further claimed,
and it was admitted, that they wrote their partnership name on
the back of the note in blank, at Naugatuck, in this state, after
the note had been signed by McDonald and dated, but before it
was filled up, and that the note was immediately afterwards
filled up in New York by McDonald or his clerk. The defendants also claimed, and Harry Stevens one of their firm testified, that he, Stevens, was the financial member of the firm, and
wrote their copartnership name by way of indorsement in blank
upon the note, at the same time that he in the same manner indomed sundry other notes payable to their own order, which had
been discounted and were held for collection by the Elm City
Bank in New Haven, and renewed, and that those indorsements
were made at the time of and upon such renewals, and that he
supposed that this note was one of that class which had been
made by McDonald, with whom they had had business dealings, and
whose paper they held and which he had renewed, and that he
had no knowledge personally of the plaintiff, or that this note
belonged to him or was to be filled up payable to his order, nor
that it had been so done until they received from the plaintiff his
letter informing them of the dishonor of the note ; and that neither
he nor his firm intended to indorse a note to or for the benefit of
the plaintiff, and that it was done by accident and mistake, and
without consideration; and that immediately on the receipt of the
plaintiff's letter he informed him that they had made no such
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indorsement, and that it must have been done by some other
copartnership o.f the same name.
The court instructed the jury that the first count in the plaintiff's declaration charged the defendants in the usual form as
indorsers of a negotiable promissory note, and that in the second
count they were also charged as indorsers by setting out the
legal effect of the indorsement of such a note by a third person
who was not an original party to it, and that as no undertaking or
contract of guaranty by the defendants, other than what is
legally inferrable from their blank indorsement, was claimed or
proved, the defendants could be subjected only as indorsers ; and
that they were not liable as indorsers unless the jury should find
that the note was knowingly and intentionally indorsed by them,
and not merely by accident or mistake, and that the plaintiff forwarded to them notice of the dishonor of the note by .the maker
on the same day or the succeeding one, after he had ascertained
their place of residence.
The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the plaintiff moved for a new trial for error in the charge of the court.
W. Ootlhren, in support of the motion.-1. The contract of the
defendants was made in this state, and is to be governed in its
construction by the laws of this state and not by those of New
York. The ibdorsement was made at Naugatuck in this state,
and was for the security of the holder, after the maker should
have failed to pay. This contract was to be performed by the
defendants here, where they resided, and not in the state of New
York. By the law of Connecticut a blank indorsement of a negotiable note by a person not a party to it, for the security of the
holder, is yrimd facie a promise to the holder that the note is due
and payable according to its tenor, and can be collected of the
maker when due by the use of due diligence.. Such a note so
indorsed is therefore admissible in evidence under a count
describing the indorsement as such a guaranty, and is conclusive
evidence in support of such a count in the absence of any evidence
of any other special contract; Perkins v. Catlin, 11 Conn. 213 ;
Laflin, v. Pomeroy, Id. 440; Banson v. Sherwood, 26 Id. 437.
Here no other special contract was shown or claimed to be shown,
so that the contract stands as implied by law.
2. The entire duty of the holder of such a note is to use due
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diligence to collect the note when it is due, if it is not paid by
the maker. He is not bound to notify the guarantor. And rea
sonable diligence is all that is required. If the debt can be collected by suit he is bound to bring suit, but if the maker is
insolvent and has no property open to attachment, or if his property is in another state by the laws of which it cannot be
attached, the holder is not bound to bring suit.
3. The defendants are equitably estopped from setting up the
defence that the note, after being indorsed by them, was by their
neglect or mistake allowed to be used for a different purpose from
that intended. The plaintiff -had no knowledge or suspicion that
the use made of the note was not the one intended, or that there
was any mistake whatever in the matter. He acted in entire
good faith, and took the note in payment of a former one then
falling due which he held against the maker. Now who shall
suffer from the use made of the note ? There has been no bad
faith, no negligence, no fault of any kind on the part of the plaintiff. On the part of the defendants there has been the voluntary
intrusting of their indorsement to a person who they knew might
use it for a different purpose from that which they intended.
Kellogg, contrA.-1. The defendants, if liable at all, could be
held liable as indorsers only, under the admitted facts in this
case. There was no contract of guaranty by the defendants with
the plaintiff, as sureties for the maker of the note. Nor was there
any consideration for such a contract. The writing of the partnership name on the back of the note, without any intention or
agreement to guaranty the note to the plaintiff as sureties for the
maker, was simply an indorsement in blank, and they can only be
charged as indorsers. In all the cases where such an indorsement has been held to be a guaranty, there has been found to be
an intention or agreement on the part of the indorser to securc
the holder of the note as surety for the maker: Beekwith v.'An.
gell, 6 Conn. 815 ; Perkin= v. Catlin, 11 Id. 213; Laflin v,
Pomeroy, Id. 440.
2. The plaintiff was not entitled to the instruction he claimed
from the court, that the legal effect of the defendants writing their
partnership name on the back of the note, under the circumstances,
was a guaranty to the payee, and not an indorsement. The most
he could claim was that it should be left to the jury to say,
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whether the defendants indorsed the note as sureties for the maker
for the benefit of the plaintiff, or as indorsers only as sureties of
all the prior parties to the note. But there was no claim or
proof of any intention or understanding on the part of the defendants, or between the parties to this suit, that they indorsed the
note as a guaranty to the plaintiff. In the absence of any such
intention or understanding, the writing their name in blank upon
the note is prim2 facie an indorsement in the character of indorsers only: Hall v. Yewcomb, 7 Hill 416, 420; Gilmore v.
Spies, 1 Barb. 158; Bllis.v. Brown, 6 Id. 282; Tillman v.
Whzeeler, 17 Johns. 326; Seaburyq. v. Hungerford, 2 Hill 80;
Laflin v. Pomeroy, 11 Conn. 440.
3. There was no excuse in this case for the neglect of notice to
the defendants of the dishonor of the note. The case shows that
their place of residence was well known at the office of the maker
of the note in New York, where the note was payable ; and the
notary who protested it was bound to make inquiry for the residence of the indorsers, at the place where the note was payable.
Besides, the plaintiff himself neglected to send notice to the defendants for "1ten or twelve days" after he ascertained their place
of residence, at the very place where the note was payable, as is
shown by his own testimony: 1 Parsons on Notes and Bills 513,
582 ; Lawrence v. Miller, 16 N. York 235.
DUTTON, J.-This case has been presented to us as if the main
question on the record was, whether a blank negotiable note
which has been indorsed in blank by a person for one purpose,
can be filled up by the maker without the consent of the indorser
by inserting the name of another person as payee, to whose order
it is made payable, and passed off to such payee for anothEr purpose, so as to make the indorser liable to such payee. An exami.
nation of the record will show that no such question is fairly
presented. But bssuming that it is, a majority of the court are
inclined to the opinion that the payee under such circumstances,
although ignorant of the purpose for which the indorsement was
made, could not recover against the indorser.
It is unnecessary to inquire what would be the legal effect
elsewhere of the indorsement of a negotiable note already filled
up by one who is not a party to it. In this state, after numerous
decisions, some of which cannot be easily reconciled with others,
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it is settled law that an indorsement by one who is not a party to
it, either of a negotiable or non-negotiable note, implies a war.
ranty that the note when due will, by the use of due diligence, be
collectible: Laflin v. Pomeroy, 11 Conn. 440 ; Catle v. Oandee,
16 Id. 223.
It is equally well settled that such an indorsement is only
primd facie evidence of what the contract was between such an
indorser and the holder of the note. It would yield to proof of
what the real contract was, if it was of a different character.
Proof is admissible even to show that the indorsement imposed no
legal liability, but was put on merely for purposes of collection. So it is admissible to show that it was a guaranty, or that
it imposed any other liability. An examination of the cases will
also prove that the rule in this state is no part of the law-merchant. Paper so indorsed has none of the sanctity that is
attached to negotiable paper as such. The indorsement is of the
nature of a power of attorney, authorizing the holder of the
paper, if there is no agreement to limit his authority, to write
over the name the agreement which the law holds such an
indorsement to imply. Some of our judges have lamented the
flexibility of the rule, and have regretted that the meaning of
such an indorsement was not absolutely fixed. This only shows
that the rule is too well established to be shaken.
We are now prepared to see what authority is given by the
indorsement of a blank negotiable note. That it would not give
the holder any actual authority to make use of it eontrary to the
intention of the indorser is plain. But it is insisted that a stranger has a right to take it for granted that the indorsement was
made after the note was filled up; and that there is nothing to
put him on his guard or to lead him to inquire for what purpose
the indorsement was made.
There can be no doubt that a blank signature on a piece of
paper authorizes the holder of it to write certain contracts over
it. In Montague v. Perkins, 22 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 516, the
court held that the signer of a blank note which was stamped,
would be considered as authorizing the holder to fill up the note
with any amount and for any time which the stamp would authorize. This shows at once the implied authority and the limitation.
It could not be contended that a mere signature of a name on the
back of a blank note would authorize the holder to write over it a
VOL. XIV.--42
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warranty of a horse or a receipt in full of all demands. The
authority depends in a great measure upon what use it is customary to make of such signatures. In fMahaiwe Bank v.
louglass, 31 Conn. 170, the defendant indorsed a blank bill of
exchange, from which the holder, who had previously signed it as
drawer, erased most of the formal part, and then wrote over his
own name a negotiable note payable to the defendant's order, and
got it discounted as an indorsed negotiable note at the Mahaiwe
Bank, which was the plaintiff in the case, and this court held
that the bank was bound at its own risk to scrutinize it, and to
ascertain whether the defendant authorized such a change. There
was enough, it was decided, to put the bank 6n its guard, and if
it trusted to the representations of the holder it was at its own
risk.
When a negotiable note, with the blank indorsement of a person who is not a party to it, is presented to a man to advance
money upon, or receive for other purposes, he will discover at
once that the indorsement is an unusual one, and not in the ordinary course of business. The obligation of the indorser, which
he is called upon to take as security, is of a peculiar character.
The inquiry would at once suggest itself, why was such an indorsement made upon such a note ? It is apparently incompatible with
the nature of such an instrument. For this reason the courts in
the state of New York will not admit that there can be but one
kind of indorsement of negotiable paper. Mr. Abbott, in his New
York Digest, vol. 1, p. 440, note, after a thorough examination
of the numerous decisions which had been made in that state,
comes to the conclusion that the rule in that state is that an
indorsement of a negotiable note by one who is not a party to it,
implies a contract as indorser only, and that he could be sued
only as indorser. We have seen that a different rule prevails
here, but it shows how incongruous any other indorsement than
one by a party to a negotiable note seems to an observer in a
state where commercial paper prevails. Such an indorsement is
calculated to create embarrassment, and to render paper less
available as negotiable paper.
For these reasons a majority of the court are inclined to think
that such an indorsement would be sufficient to put the payee or
person to -whom it is offered on his guard, and require of him,
before he relies upon it, to make inquiry.
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Where an instrument is thus diverted from its lawful purpose,
one of two parties must suffer loss. The question is, on whom
should the loss properly fall ? The indorser would have no reason for believing that the note would be filled out in any other
way than the usual one of inserting his name as payee. He would
not therefore be chargeable with a want of due care. The person
who should take such a note, relying on such an indorsement,
would be chargeable with some degree of negligence. There
would be enough to excite his suspicion that all was not right, and
lead him to make inquiry. We are inclined, therefore, to think
that, between him and the indorser, the loss should fall upon him.
But, as we have ilready intimated, we do not find this question
on the record. The declaration contains two counts, one on the
indorsement of a negotiable note in the usual way, the other on
the indorsement by the defendants of a note payable to the order
of the plaintiff. The only note offered in evidence was one payable to the order of the plaintiff, indorsed by the defendants. It
was admitted that the note, when indorsed by the defendants, was
a blank one, and that it was afterwards filled up by the maker,
and made payable to the order of the plaintiff, and not of the
defendants. The motion shows that the only claim which the
plaintiff made on which any question arises was, "that the court
should instruct the jury that the legal effect of the defendants'
writing their partnership name in blank on the back of the note,
notwithstanding there was no special contract between the parties,
was that of a guaranty to the plaintiff of the payment of the note
and not that of a collateral undertaking as indorsers." The judge,
in his charge, did not sustain this proposition. We have already
seen that by the law of this state he could not. A guarantee
imports a promise that the note shall be paid at all events. Assuming that the fact that the note was in blank when indorsed by
the defendants made no difference as to their liability, the claim
which was made by the plaintiff was one which could not have
been allowed. The refusal, therefore, of the judge to charge as
claimed by the plaintiff was not a ground for a new trial. As
the plaintiff did not ask the court to leave this part of the case
to the jury on any other principle of law, he cannot complain
now that it was not done.
The remarks -of the judge with reference to the question
whether the indorsement was intentional or not, apply only to the
first count. But the admitted facts in the case Thow that there
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could be no recovery on that count. The defendants evidently
could not be charged as ordinary indorsers. The evidence introduced by the plaintiff himself showed also that no legal notice
was given. It is unnecessary, therefore, to inquire whether these
remarks were correct or not, as the plaintiff could not have been
injured by them.
A new trial is not advised.
In this opinion HINmAN, C. J., and PARK,
BuTmn and McCuRDY, Js., dissented.

3., concurred.

McCurmy, J.-In this case the plaintiff, as a condition of taking
a new note, required an indorser. McDonald' sent, and the plaintiff accepted, the note in suit. This is payable to the plaintiff or
order, signed by McDonald, and indorsed in blank by the defend
ants. According to the well-known law of Connecticut, this
instrument is to be treated as a non-negotiable note indorsed by
the defendants for better security. It was taken by the plaintiff
before due, for a valuable consideration, and without notice of
any other facts affecting it. The plaintiff had a right to consider
it as having been indorsed after it was filled up, such being the
usual course. The defendants say that 'when so indorsed the
note itself was in blank, except the date and name of the maker,
and that it was left by them to be filled up by McDonald, and
passed by him,.but they "1supposed" he would make it payable
to their order, and use it at the Elm City Bank.
The result of this would have been to make them indorsers of
a negotiable paper, while the effect of writing it payable to the
order of the plaintiff was to make them guarantors of a note not
negotiable. But in many parts of the community notes of this
kind are nearly as common as negotiable notes, and as well understood and as frequently used in the regular course of business,
and in the absence of any particular instructions McDonald had
as much right to fill the blank with one kind as with the other.
The term "indorser" is applied to one who writes his name on
"the back of either.

Under these circumstances I had considered it an elementary
proposition, that the defendants having trusted McDonald, and he
having acted within the apparent scope of his authority, they
could not set up a secret agreement (much less a bare supposition),
to defeat the action.
The law on this point rests upon two principles (or perhaps
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forms of the same principle)-first, that a man is bound by the
acts of an agent done within the apparent scope of his authority,
and, second, that whenever of two innocent persons one must
suffer from the misconduct of a third, it should be the one who
has trusted him, and enabled him to cheat. These principles are
general and of the highest importance. They apply as well to
one kind of note as to the other, and as well to the sale of a horse
as to the transfer of a note.
It is said, I Swift's Digest 434, in speaking of non-negotiable
notes, that "1while the indorsement remains in blank, and in the
hlands of the first assignee, it is admissible for the assignor to
show any special agreement," &c., "but when it has been filled
up, or has been transferredto anotherperson, no such proof would
be admissible ;" also, that "a subsequent indorsee cannot be affected
by any agreement with a prior indorsee which does not appear on
the face of the instrument." In the case of Aahaiwe Bank v.
-Douglass,31 Conn. 170, the court say: "The presumed authority
of one to whom the indorser intrusts a paper entirely blank to
write upon its face either a note or bill for whatever sum he
pleases, and in case of an inchoate note or bill, his presumed
authority to fill all blanks existing in them when indorsed is conceded; for without the exercise of such authority the paper
would be valueless, and the indorsement a nugatory act." In the
case of Russel v. Langstaff, Doug. 514, the plaintiff, when he
took the notes, knew that they were blank at the time of the
indorsement, and were afterward filled up by Galley, the maker.
Lord MANSFIELD says: "The indorsement on a blank note is a
letter of credit for an indefinite sum. The defendant said, ' Trust
Galley to any amount, and I will be his security.' It does not
lie in his mouth to say the indorsements were irregular." See also
the opinion of Chief Justice WILLIAMs, in NYorwich Bank v.
Hfyde, 13 Conn. 284. Also, Cruchley v. Clarence, 2 Maule &
Selw. 90; Montague v. Perkins, 22 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 516;
Barker v. Sterne, Id. 502; Kimbro v. 14ytle, 10 Yerg. 417;
Torrey v. Fisk, 10 Smedes & Marsh. 590.
It will be observed that there is no claim of any fraud by
McDonald, or any agreement, or even understanding by him that
he was to do differently from what he did, but merely that the
defendants "' supposed" he would.
There was no negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and no-
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thing to excite his suspicion. He demanded the note of McDonald
with another name, as security. He received just what he required,
and it was immaterial to him whether the note which the defendants indorsed was negotiable or not; the security was the same
Notes of precisely this character are too common, all over the
-country, to create doubt or surprise, and McDonald had, as we
have seen, as much authority to fill up the blank in one way as
in the other.
But the case shows gross laches on the part of the defendants.
All the other notes indorsed by them at the same time as the one
in suit, were made payable to their own order, at the Elm City
Bank, before they were indorsed. If this note was to be one of
the same kind, why should this alone have been left by them in
blank to be filled up by McDonald as he might please?
But it is said that the plaintiff requested the court to charge
that the contract of the defendants was a guarantee of the payment
of the note at all events; and that the law does not imply this.
I do not so understand the request. The plaintiff had unquestionably set out in the second count of his declaration exactly the kind
of contract which the law implies, from the name of the defendants being in blank on the back of the note. This, in the case of
a note not negotiable, is usually and technically called a guarantee,
to distinguish it from what is called an indorsement of a nego
tiable note. The acts to be done by the holders of a note with
a guarantee are different from those necessary to be done by the
holders of a note with a proper indorsement.
The defence was, that the plaintiff had not performed the acts
required in the case of an indorsement. The reply was that this
was not an indorsement, but a guarantee, and that the plaintiff
had done everything which he was bound to do in such a case.
He therefore requested the court to charge that this contract was
one of guarantee, but the court held that it was one of indorsement.
The claim was simply that this contract was a guarantee, and
not that a guarantee implies payment at all events, and without
condition. The whole case, setting out the nature of the contract, its incidents, the conditions of a recovery, and a performance of those conditions by him, excludes the idea that the plaintiff claimed or expected the court to charge that the defendants
were bound to pay the note unconditionally and at all events.
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The request was certainly a proper one, and the charge manifestly wrong.
It seems to me that the decision in this case will be exceedingly unfortunate in its practical effect, as it is calculated to
render valueless a kind of paper extensively used and confidently
relied upon among all classes of the community.
BUTLER, J.-I
concur in the views taken by Judge MCCURDY.
I am also constrained to say that I think the case was not left to
the jury as it should have been. The motion recites the claims
of the parties in respect to the facts, and goes on to state that, in
view of the facts so claimed to be proved, the plaintiff asked the
court to charge, 1st, what the legal effect of such an indorsement
was; and, 2d, that in such a case the insolvency of the maker
was an excuse for not attempting to collect the note of the maker.
The charge of the judge did not meet these claims, or either of
them; but, on the other hand, gave the jury to understand that
"as no undertaking or contract of guarantde by the defendants,
other than what is legally inferable from the blank indorsement,
was claimed or proved, the defendants could only be subjected as
indorsers." The import of the charge, as I understand it, is, that
a special contract must be proved in such a case, or the defendants will be mere indorsers ; or it assumes that, on the facts, the
legal contract which the law imports from such a blank indorsement could not be found by them. And in either event, the
charge was not such as the plaintiff was entitled to have, and his
case was not properly presented to the jury. I think, therefore,
a new trial should be granted.
We have discussed the question involved in the preceding case so much in
the REGISTER, within the last few years,
that we should not be likely to present
much that is new by an extended review of the cases.
I. It seems to be established by the
ease of Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 252,
and other cases which have followed in
its wake, that if the defendant has himself been guilty of negligence which
tended to mislead the plaintiff and to
induce him to accept the security, to that

extent the defendant must be held responsible, although not bound by the
terms of the contract: BIGELOW, C. J.,
in MVade v. Withington, I Alien 561, 562,
563,
II. If the paper when presented to
the plaintiff was in blank, or he had
reason to know or suspect that it issued
in blank, and he took the paper without
inquiry, he can only hold the defendant
to the extent of the actual contract:
Hatch v. Searley, 2 Sm. & Gif. 147, 1
Am. Lead. Cas. 321, 322. To thia
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extent the early ease of Russell v. Langstaffe, Doug. 515, has been qualified by
the more recent decisions.
1T1. In all cases which do not come
within either of the foregoing categories,
if the form of the contract drawn over
the defendant's signature is one not
negotiable and where the equities of the

defendant may be shown in defence, if
the signature was made blank he may
always be allowed to show the real contract, and will not be liable beyond that
extent: Sylvester v. Doumee, 20 Vt. Rep.
355, and cases cited.
I. F. R.

Su~reme Court of Missouri.
THE STATE EX REL. HANNIBAL AND ST. JOSEPH RAILROAD
COMPANY v. ROBERT SHACKLETT ET AL.
Liability of Collector and Ms Sureties for taxes Illegally Colleted.-A county
collector of revenue who, against protest, compulsorily collects taxes assessed upon
property exempt from taxation, where such exemption is apparent upon the face
of the tax-book, is liable (and so also are his sureties) on his official bond for the
amount of taxes so illegally collected and received by him. The party paying
such taxes is not in such cases limited to an action against the assessor or the
county.
ACTION on county collector's official bond.

Defendant's demur-

rer to the petition or complaint was overruled and judgment rer,dered for the plaintiffs.
Defendants appealed to the Supreme
Court. The other facts appear in the opinion.
Read and the Messrs. Vories, for the appellants,

contended

that the facts alleged in the petition showed no breach in the
bond, but affirmatively showed that the officer had only done what

the statute directed.

(Rev. Code, 1855, 1342, sees. 23, 39, 41.)

If relator's property was exempt, it was error to assess it, and
the remedy must be against the assessor, and not the collector.
He ought to have appealed from the action of the assessor in the

mode pointed out by the law.

-Elliotv. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 137,

is not in point, as the officer was there held liable for his own
error, and not the error of another. We cite and rely upon the

following authorities: 17 Maine 44, 20 Id. 199, 4 Grednl. 64,
72, 9 Johns. 369, 7 Id. 179.
James Car, for the plaintiffs, made the following points, and
cited the following authorities to sustain them:I. The stock of the relator, by its charter, is exempt from all
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state and county taxes: Hannibal and St. dosevh B. B. Co. v.
Shacklett, 30 Mo. Rep. 550.
II. The stock represents all the property of the relator. Hence
the property is exempt, and the assessment of the state and county
taxes thereon is illegal and void: School .Directorsv. Carlisle
Bank, 8 Watts 289; Bangor and Piscataquis B. B. Co. v.
Harris, 21 Me. Rep. 583; s. c. 1 Am. R. Cas. 131 ; Han. .
St. Jo. R. B. Co. v. Slzacklett, 30 Mo. Rep. 550.
III. The illegality of this assessment was patent on the taxbook; the collector had notice of this illegality, i. e., that the
assessor had no jurisdiction over the relator's property to assess
it. He is bound to know the law; and in coercing the collection
of the taxes assessed, he became a trespasser and liable in damages: Allen v. Gray, 11 Conn. Rep. 95 ; Grumon v. Raymond,
1 Id. 40 ; Finn v. Com., 6 Barr 460 ; Com. v. Kennard, 8 Pick.
13; Bland v. Ward, 7 Mass. 128 ; Brown v. Comyton, 8
T. R. 424 ; Elliott v. Swartwout, 10 Peters 137 ; Bipley v. Gelston, 9 Johns. 870; Fry v. Lockwood, 4 Conn. 454; Wisnor v.
Buckley, 15 Wend. 321, 7 Johns. 179; 5 Id. 252.
IV. The liability of the sureties is commensurate with the
liability of the principal. Hence the principal being liable, the
sureties are likewise liable; Garberv. Com., 7 Barr 265; Aueselman v. Cbm., 7 Watts 240; Evans v. Com., 8 Id. 398 ; Masser
v. Strickland, 17 S. & R. 854; Lloyd v. Barr,11 Pa. Rep. (1
Jones) 42 ; -Eaglesv. Beyn, 5 Whart. 144 ; Skinner v. Phillips,
4 Mass. 69; Archer v. Noble, 8 Greenl. 418; Harris v. Harmon, 11 Me. 241, 4 J. J. Marsh. 299 ; King v. Chase, 15 N. H.
9; Parkhurstv. Sumner, 23 Vt. 588; State v. Moore, 19 Mo.
872; State v. Farmer,21 Mo. 160; State v. luir,20 Mo. 808;
Carmack v. Com., 5 Binn. 184; Crom. v. Stockton, 5 Monroe 192;
United States v. Niclwll, 12 Wheat. 505.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WAGNER, C. J.-This was an action instituted in the Marion
county Circuit Court, on the relation of the Hannibal and St.
Joseph Railroad Company, against Robert Shacklett and the
sureties on his official bond. It appears from the record that
Shacklett was sheriff and ex officio collector of Marion county,
and that the breach alleged was levying on and advertising for
sale and coercing the payment of taxes on property belonging to
the relator, and not subject to taxation. The property was assessed
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by the assessor of Marion county, and a certified copy of the tax
book, as the law directs, was duly delivered to Shacklett as collector, for which he gave his receipt. The relator insisted that
the property was exempt from the payment of the taxes imposed,
and refused to pay the same, whereupon Shacklett levied on a
large quantity of rolling stock belonging to the relator's road
and advertised it for sale to satisfy the taxes assessed against it.
The relator then, to regain possession of the property, paid the
amount claimed under written protest, and also gave the collector
notice in writing that it would commence suit for the recovery
of the money. Accordingly, suit was instituted, and this court
decided that the property was not subject t6 taxation, and that
the assessment was unwarranted by law and a nullity; and judgment was thereafter rendered against Shacklett in favor of the
relator for the amount of money so collected. (See Hannibaland
St. Joseph B. B. Co. v. Shacklett, 30 Mo..550.) The relator
failing to make the money on the judgment obtained against
Shackkett, has brought this suit against the sureties on his bond,
for the purpose of getting satisfaction of the demand.
It is contended by the appellants (the sureties) that the action
cannot be maintained; that the tax-book furnished a full justification of the collector, and the law peremptorily required that he
should proceed to the collection of the taxes in the maniner he
pursued, and that he could not go behind the books to inquire
into the validity of the assessment. And also that the sureties
cannot be held liable, as he was pursuing the plain line of his
duty and executing the mandates of the law, and that his action
therefore amounted to no breach of the condition of his bond.
The general rule is that the tax-books, when regularly certified
and authenticated, afford the same protection to the collector in
collecting the taxes therein assessed that a judgment at law does
to the sheriff in enforcing an execution issued thereon.
Now, where the court has no jurisdiction of the cause, there
the officer is not obliged to obey, and, if he does, it is at his
peril, though he do it by virtue of an execution or other process
directed to him; a void authority being the same as none at all.
And a sheriff is bound to inquire into the authority of a court
that issues a writ, and he is liable for executing it where it is
issued by a court having no jurisdiction: Brown v. Henderson,
1 Mo. 134; Mayor v. Morgan, 7 Martin N. S. 2; 8 Bac. Abr.
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691; case of TheA2arshalsea,10 Coke 76, a; Brow. v. Crompton,
8 T. R. 424. The officer is bound to know the law, and if he
executes process which is void emanating from a court or officer
having no jurisdiction, he acts at his peril, and will not be protected. Here the assessment was illegal, its illegality was
apparent on the very face of the tax-book placed in the collector's
hands, as much so as if it had purported to have been made on
the court-house or other property which the law expressly exempts
from taxation. But since the decision in this court, this is no
longer a disputable question. It is conclusive against Shacklett
and his sureties on the bond: 3'cJaughlinv. Bank of Potomac,
7 Hlow. 220, 17 Curtis 97 ; Zing v. chase, 15 N. H. 9 ; Parkhurst
v. Sumner, 23 Vt. 538 ; Evans v. Comm., 8 Watts 398 ; Hempstead v. Coste, in this court, Oct. Term 1865.
The question now remaining to be considered is, can the sure.
ties be held liable to this proceeding ? The bond contained the
following condition: "That if the said Robert Shacklett should
faithfully and punctually collect and pay over all the state and
county revenue for the two years next ensuing the first day of
September next 1858 and until his successor should be elected
and qualified, and that he would in all things faithfully perform
the duties of collector according to law, then said written obligation was to be void and of no effect." Can it with truth or with
propriety be alleged that when the collector placed himself in the
attitude of a trespasser and wrongfully collected money or property not subject to taxation, that he was faithfully performing
the duties of collector according to law ?
The collector is intrusted with vast powers and important
responsibilities, and the law has deemed it advisable to require
that he should give sufficient security to secure his good conduct, or to indemnify those who may suffer in consequence of his
neglect or malfeasance.
Judge SCOTT pointedly remarks: "It would be hard if a sheriff,
by virtue of the process placed in his hands, should oppress or
ruin individuals, and they should have no other security than his
own resources.' He may be insolvent and unable to respond in
damages out of his own estate. Such a condition of things would
drive men to a resistance of the execution of the process of the
law: State v. ZKoore, 19 Mo. 372. A surety on an official bond
is responsible for all moneys which come into the hands of the
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officer while in office, and which he subsequently fails to account
for and pay over: Bryan v. The United States, 1 Black U. S.
140 ; 12 Wheat. 505.
When an officer tortiously seizes goods, it is not merely a private trespass, but a breach of his bond; and a person whose goods
are thus wrongfully seized should have an action against him and
his sureties on his official bond: State v. Moore, 19 Mo., sypra,
21 Mo. 160; The People v. Schuyler, 4 Comst. 173; Archer v.
Voble, 3 Greenl. 418 ; Harrisv. Rawson, 11 Me. 241 ; Carmack
v. Crom., 5 Binn. 184; Crom. v. Stockton, 5 Monroe 192; Phillips
v. Tarris, 8 J. J. Marsh. 122; Potts v. Com., 4 Id. 202; Forsythe v. Ellis, 4 Id. 298.
The judgment is affirmed.
Hoimns, J., concurred.

LOVELAOE,

J., was absent.

Supreme iourt of Pennsylvania.
JOHN B. HAUSER AND DANIEL BUSER v. THE COMMONWEALTH
OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Jurors are competent witnesses both in civil and criminal cases.
The journal which the warden of a prison is by law required to keep is not a
technical record in such sense as to be the exclusive evidence of the fact that
defendant was in a -certain prison at a certain time.
Where a witness had been twice convicted of an infamous offence, but exhibits
a pardon for the second conviction, and says, on examination by the defendant,
that he has been pardoned also for the first, the defendant cannot assign as error
that the fact of such first pardon was improperly proved.
A witness who, though not formally impeached, testifies under circumstances
tending to discredit him, has a right to detail facts otherwise irrelevant which corroborate his statements.
On a trial for murder, where it has been shown that the prisoner spoke of an
intention to rob the murdered person and if necessary to murder her, the prosecution may show that the murdered person had money before her death and that none
had been found by her administrator after the murder; and the administration
account is competent evidence of the latter fact.

ERROR to Oyer and Terminer of Cambria county.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
WooDwARD, C. J.-Polly Paul, an elderly maiden lady, who
was reputed to possess money, and Cassie Munday, a young girl
who lived with her, were both cruelly murdered on the evening
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of the 7th June, 1865, in Summerhill township, Cambria county.
The plaintiffs in error were defendants below, in an indictment
which charged only the murder of Miss Paul, and after a full and
careful trial were both convicted of murder in the first degree.
The evidence was circumstantial. A great number of independ.
ent and connected facts were proved, and were so placed before
tho jury by the learned judge who presided at the trial, that*no
exception was taken in his charge, and consequently no question
arises out of his instructions to the jury for our consideration
upon this writ of error. But several bills of exception to evidence were sealed, and these are assigned for error. Although
the evidence, as a whole chain, led irresistibly to the conclusion
of guilt, yet, if any material link of it was defective, and such
as ought to have been rejected, the prisoners have good right to
complain in this court. Let us therefore carefully examine the
errors assigned, to see if any of them are well founded.
The 1st and 9th errors complain of the admission of John Buck
and George W. Kirby, two of the jurors in the box, as witnesses
on the part of the Commonwealth. In respect to the first of
these witnesses it might be sufficient to say that the objection was
not made until after he was sworn as a witness, when it was too
late to object to his competency, and in respect to both it might
be said that they were called to incidental and comparatively
immaterial points that did not touch the corpus delicti; but waiving these answers, let it be distinctly said that jurors are not
incompetent witnesses in either criminal or civil issues. They
have no interest that disqualifies, and there is no rule of public
policy that excludes them. On the contrary, it has been our
immemorial practice to examine jurors as witnesses when
called
by either party. It is sanctioned by Archbold, see Evidence,
vol. 1, p. 151 ; was recognised in principle by us in PlankBoad
v. Thomas, 8 Harris 92, where a viewer was held to be competent, and is regulated by the 158th section of the Act of Assembly of 14th April 1834, relating to juries, Purdon 586, which
requires every juror impannelled in any cause to disclose his
knowledge of anything relative to the matter in controversy, in
open court, before the jury retires to make a verdict. The learned
counsel argued that the practice violates the constitutional right
of the accused, who are entitled to a speedy and public trial by
an impartial jury, and to be confronted with the witnesses. Our
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law takes the utmost care to secure to the accused in capital cases
an impartial jury; it almost allows prisoners to select their own
triers. They may examine jurors as to their knowledge of circumstances, their expressions, opinions, or prejudices, and challenge
as many as they can show cause against, and may challenge twenty
without showing cause, and then, if any juror happens to have
knowledge of any pertinent fact, he is bound to disclose it in
time for the accused to cross-examine him, and to explain or contradict his testimony. If this be not a fulfilling of the constitutional injunction in behalf of impartial juries it would be difficult
to invent a plan that would fulfil it, and at the same time be consistent with the demands of public justice.
But counsel imagine that the constitutional right to confront
witnesses would be abridged in the instance of witnesses taken
from the jury-box, because their truth and veracity could not be
attacked without damage to the attacking party. As to material
witnesses,-those, we mean, upon whose testimony the event is
essentially dependent,-we think they ought not to be admitted
into the jury-box, and we believe the general practice is to exclude them where the fact is discovered in time; but we do not
think the constitutional provision alluded to, nor any rule of law,
is violated by the examination of a juror as a witness. The ?
.prioripresumption is, that he is a man of truth and veracity, or
he would not have been summoned as a juror, and confronting
witnesses does not mean impeaching their characters, but means
cross-examination in presence of the accused.
When the common law of England was transported to these
colonies, it gave a person charged with a capital crime no compulsory process to obtain witnesses, and entitled him to no examination by himself or his counsel of witnesses brought against him.
As Queen Mary said to her Chief Justice, Sir RICHARD MORGAN,
"It did not admit any witness to speak, or any other matter to
be heard in favor of the adversary, her majesty being party."
To remedy this state of the law our constitutions all declared,
what statutes had then provided in England, that the accused
should have an impartial trial by jury, should have process for
witnesses, and be entitled to counsel to examine them, and to
cross-examine those for the prosecution in the presence of-onfronting-the accused.
And this is now our inflexible rule. I have known one case in
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which a great question was made, whether a magistrate's written
examination of a prisoner, who afterwards'broke jail and escaped,
was evidence against a confederate, under the provisions of the
statute of 2 & 3 Philip & Mary, ch. 10. The case did not reach
this court, though the opinions of some of the then judges were
taken, and it was finally decided that, notwithstanding the above.
named statute had been extended to Pennsylvania, it was displaced by our constitution, and that no ezparte testimony could
be given against a prisoner in a capital case.
Such, then, is the meaning of the constitutional provision which
counsel invoked, and it is impossible to apply it to exclude a juror
witness. He, like all other witnesses, must "1 confront" the
accused; that is, be examined in the presence of the accused,
and be subject to cross-examination, but he is not disqualified to
be a witness.
It became necessary for the Commonwealth to show, in the
course of the trial, that the prisoner had been in the Western
Penitentiary, and in intercourse with other prisoners there, and
particularly one Philip Folgart, a convict, sent from Cambria
county, and from whom the prisoner heard of Miss Paul, the theory
of the prosecution being that the prisoners had plotted the robbery
and murder of Miss Paul whilst in prison, and that they proceeded to execute the plot as soon after their enlargement as circumstances permitted.
Sheriff Buck, who took Folgert to the penitentiary, was called
to prove that fact, and David McKelvy proved that the defendants had been in the penitentiary, and fixed the time of their
discharge. This testimony was objected to, and forms the basis
of the 2d and 4th assignments, because the warden of the Penitentiary is required, by the Act of Assembly of April 23d 1829,
Purdon 651, to keep a journal, in which the reception and discharge of prisoners is regularly entered, and that record, it is
argued, was the best evidence of the facts to which these witnesses swore.
The Act of Assembly does not make the warden's journal a
record, nor declare that it shall be evidence of the facts therein
entered. The main purpose of keeping it is to inform the inspectors of the prison of the name, age, condition, and circumstances
of each prisoner, that their duties may be intelligently performed.
If the question had been whether Folgart and these defendants
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had been legally incarcerated, it might have been necessary to
show every formality prescribed by law, but the main point was
the conspiracy to rob and murder, and the fact of their being
together in the penitentiary was only incidental or introductory
to that point. Says Mr. Greenleaf, vol. 1, p. 68, where the
record or document appointed by law is not a part of the fact to
be proved, but is merely a collateral or subsequent memorial of
the fact, such as the registry of marriages, births and the like,
it has not an exclusive character, but any other legal proof is
admitted. If the marriage or birth of the prisoners had been
wanted as introductory to evidence of the crimes charged, it would
scarcely be argued that a witness who was present at the birth or
marriage was incompetent to prove it because a registry existed.
In questions of identity, records and registries are not the best
evidence, for after the entries in them are received, it is necessary to individuate the persons mentioned, and this must be done
by evidence dekors the document. We have an illustration in
the 3d error assigned, which complains of the admission of the
record of Folgart's conviction and sentence without identification
of his person. We do not mean to say that we considered the 3d

assignment any better than the 2d and 4th, but simply that ir
illustrates the necessity to add even to a judicial record, oral
evidence of identification. The record proved Folgart's conviction and sentence, and Sheriff Buck identified him as the individual he took to the penitentiary, whilst McKelvy identified the
defendants -on trial as inmates of the prison. We cannot be persuaded that there was any error in submitting such evidence to
the jury. The 5th assignment relates to the witness, William
McCreary. When this individual was called by the commonwealth, he stated in answers to questions by the prisoners' counsel,
that he had recently got out of the penitentiary, where he had
been confined on a conviction for burglary ; that he had been in
before on a similar charge and had been pardoned, and that the
pardon was in Washington county. The counsel for the commonwealth then exhibited an executive pardon for the last offence,
and the court admitted the witness. This is assigned for the 5th
error.
If the pardon exhibited did not cover the first as well as the
last conviction (of which we cannot judge, for the pardon is not
shown to us), the fact that he had been pardoned for the first
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offence was elicited by the examination of the defendants' counsel,
and it is not for the defendants to object that the fact was improperly proved. Both pardons were sufficiently proved, to justify
the court's admission of the witness. And we think there was
nothing in the testimony of this witness on which to ground the
7th and 8th assignments of error. He was permitted to explain
the situation and relation of the cells, and the arrangements made
of prisoners, to show what opportunities he possessed of acquiring
knowledge of the facts he detailed.
And when he was recalled, he was permitted to detail what
occurred when Messrs. Noon and Johnson visited him in his cell;
that he showed them how communications between adjoining cells
could be made, and he was permitted also to testify that no promise of a pardon or other inducements had been held out to him
to testify in this case. All this was objected to because it tended
to corroborate the witness, when no attempt had been made' to
impeach him, and the question about a pardon compelled the witness to discredit himself or commit perjury if such promise had
been held out.
Though not formally impeached, this witness as a pardoned
convict testified necessarily under circumstances that tended
strongly to discredit him. The jury would inevitably regard his
testimony with suspicion. It was very proper therefore to corroborate him, and surely if he could demonstrate to his visitors
that communication between cells was possible, he had a right to
prove the fact in corroboration of his statement that such communications had actually taken place. And he was entitled also to
the fact that no inducement had been held out to him to testify
against the defendants. These were rights of the witness, and
he was in circumstances to justify his claim of them and the
court's concession of them. The communications of prisoners
among themselves about " points" to be made when they get out
is not the most satisfactory kind of evidence, especially when
proved only by one of their number, pardoned for the purpose of
being made a witness; but the credibility of this witness was
fairly submitted to the jury, and there were many circumstances
in proof by other witnesses that tended strongly to corroborate
him. True, the testimony was most damaging to the defendants,
if believed, but the commonwealth was entitled to lay it before
VOL. XIV.-43
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the jury; and it is not for us to doubt that the jury scanned it
closely, and gave it no more weigt than was due to it.
The 6th error is founded on the declarations of Mary Stipoliski
made to her parents the evening of the murder. This little girl
had been sent at nightfall to fetch home the cows, and when she
came home she told her parents what she saw and heard, and that
she thought the men she saw at Polly Paul's were not the right
kind of persons.
In itself considered, this evidence was of little importance,
for it did not lead even to an early discovery of the murder.
Nobody seems to have attended to the girl's story, and it might
be considered irrelevant and harmless evidence if subsequent discoveries had not shown that these defendants were prowling about
the neighborhood, and were the very two men the little girl saw
at Miss' Paul's. The fact that she saw men there and heard
sounds of distress was competent and relevant, and it was rendered no less so by the additional facts that she told it to her
parents directly she returned home. This circumstance she had
a right to refer to, as refreshing her memory. And what her
parents said in reply was also a circumstance to refresh her
memory. The damaging part of this evidence does not consist
in the narrative that burst from the lips of this little girl on her
return home, much less in the responses of the parents, but it
consists in the facts themselves, to which she swore on the trial,
and which interweave themselves with facts furnished by other
witnesses in such a manner as to form what the jury considered
a web of guilt. The facts, that is, what she saw and heard, are
not objected to as improper evidence, but only her relation of
the facts to her parents, and their replies. Ordinarily, declarations of third parties, in the absence of the accused, are not evidence, but these declarations were so connected with the circumstances as to become a part of them-or, if they cannot be so
-considered, they were immaterial and harmless, and therefore
form no ground for reversing.
The 10th assignment relates to the administration account of
the estate of the deceased. It was a public record, and we think
properly admitted. It is usual to prove the circumstances of the
decedent's estate, where the murder was committed lucri eauaa,
and the administration account is the best possible evidence of
-%hat personal estate was possessed. If it failed to show a per-
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sonal estate which other evidence proved to have belonged to the
deceased, and the commonwealth was thus enabled to furnish the
jury with an inference of robbery, it was an inference to which
the commonwealth was entitled. A lone woman, shown to have
had money, is foully murdered, and her administrator finds no
money to administer. When men are on trial for her murder
who spoke of making a point to rob her, and if necessary murder
her, and who spoke also of the "pile" they expected to obtain, we
think it was competent to show by the public records that her
personal representative found no money.
As to the overruling the motion for a new trial, it is not a
proper subject for an assignment of error. The discretion of the
court is not reviewable here. Nor is the complaint that the
court misapplied its own rule of practice, a matter of which we
can take notice. The rule is prescribed by the court itself, to
regulate its own discretion, and the refusal to grant a new trial
is an exercise of discretion with which we cannot interfere,
whether it conformed to the rule of court or disregarded it.
We have thus gone carefully through the several errors assigned
upon this record, and finding no one that would justify us in
reversing the judgment, it must stand affirmed.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
McDONALD ET AL. v. MlcDONALD.
Where land is paid for jointly by A. and B., and the deed is made to A. alone,
under such circumstances that a trust, not within the Statute of Frauds, would
result by implication of law in favor of B., the character of such trust is not
altered by an express verbal agreement or by a declaration of A. that he holds the
land subject to such trust ; and therefore it may be proved by parol.
A trust implied by law from a given state of facts, is not brought within the
Statute of Frauds so as to require to be proved by written evidence, by the declaration of the trustee that he holds subject to such trust.

ACTION of partition. The facts sufficiently appear by the
opinion of the court, delivered by
FRAZER, J.-The plaintiffs and defendants were the heirs at
law of Patrick McDonald; deceased. The defendants, who are
appellants here, claim each one-third of the land by answer, in
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the nature of a counter claim, in which they admit that the legal
title was in Patrick at the time of his death, but aver that they,
Edward and Michael, were the equitable owners of the undivided
two thirds part thereof, because they and the said Patrick McDonald purchased said lands in partnership, paid for the same
with their joint moneys, had occupied them in common, and
improved them for their joint benefit, and had cultivated them
continuously for their joint support, and as partners from 'the
dates of purchase to the time of the death of Patrick, &c. ; and
that the deeds for the several pieces of lands described were made
to Patrick to be held, and which he did hold by agreement in
trust for said partnership concern. Reply 1. General denial.
2. Twenty years' adverse possession. Verdict and judgment for
plaintiffs.
A cross-error assigned may as well first be considered. It is
that the defendants were permitted to testify as witnesses in their
own behalf. The solution of the question depends upon the Act
of 1861, 2 G. & H. 168, note. By that act the parties to an
action are made competent witnesses for themselves, except in
certain cases; and amongst the exceptions are named, "all suits
where an executor, administrator, or guardian is a party," and
judgment may be rendered for or against the estate represented
by the executor, administrator, or guardian. The case at bar
cannot be brought within the exceptions of the statute by any
kind of construction of which the language is susceptible. This
is not a case to which an administrator, executor, or guardian is
a party. There was an infant defendant to the complaint, for
whom the court appointed a guardian ad litem, but that did not
make the guardian ad litem a party to the suit. The most that
can be said is, that there was exactly the same reason for making
the exception broad enough to cover cases like this that there was
to make it as it is. That argument would -have controlling influence if the language of the act left any room for construction,
but as there is none, it can be efficient only when addressed to
the legislature. We adhere to the decision made upon this point
in D)ahoney v. Hall, 20 Ind. 264.
The evidence strongly supported the allegations of the answer.
It tended to show an agreement between the three brothers, made
in Europe and afterwards renewed in this country, to labor on
joint account for the purpose of creating a common fund to be
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investei in lands for the benefit of all; and that this agreement
was faithfully executed, each by his earnings contributing to the
fund, and the lands being so purchased jointly occupied and used;
but this contract was not in writing, and the title-deeds were all
taken in the name of the deceased by agreement as alleged. The
question raised by instructions given to the jury, and others
asked and refused, and which we must decide, is whether, under
such circumstances, there would be a resulting trust in favor of
the appellants. That an estate purchased in the name of one
with money belonging to and paid by another is subject to a
resulting trust in favor of the party to whom the money belonged,
is a familiar doctrine of equity. The trust is implied, and need
not therefore be proved by written evidence; the case being
expressly excepted from the operation of the Statute of Frauds.
But in the case before us there is an additional element-it
was orally expressly agreed that the lands should be purchased
and held for joint use and benefit. Does this change the case so
as to render parol evidence insufficient to establish the trust?
This question has, we believe, never been expressly decided by
this court in a case where the point was necessarily involved, but
it has nevertheless attracted the attention of the judges, and
received some consideration at their hands. In Irwins v. Ivers,
7 Ind. 308, Judge DAvIsoN, in delivering the opinion, seemed
to favor the proposition that though the circumstances attending
the purchase would of themselves raise a trust by implication,
yet that if the same trust had been also verbally and specifically
declared, then the trust must fail, because it would be within the
statute. But in Miller v. Blackburn, 14 Ind. 62, Judge HllxA
withheld his assent from this doctrine, and Judge WoRD N, in the
same case, expressed himself not satisfied with it, as applicable
to cases where the trust proved by parol is the same as that
resulting by implication. The elementary writers declare the
rule in the broad and general terms, which received the assent of
Judge DA vsoN above referred to. But we have not been able
to discover any adjudicated case which justifies it. Nor does it
seem to us to rest upon any solid reason. Where a particular
trust is clearly shown by parol to have been intended, there is
manifest justice in excluding thereby the implication of another,
altogether different, in all cases not tainted with fraud; but it
would be impossible to assign any satisfactory reason for a deter-
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mination that a trust in equity in aid of justice and fair dealing,
implied from the circumstance that the cestui que trtst paid the
purchase-money, shall be defeated by the mere fact that the
trustee was honest enough to declare orally the obligation which
rested on his conscience, and too honest to deny or conceal it.
Upon principle, it would be a paradox to say that the frank
admission and promulgation of the existence of a fact shall prevent that very fact from having its rightful consequences, and
indeed prevent'it from being shown by other means ; or that it
should bar the implication of its existence which would otherwise
result; the express declaration of the truth orally, becoming a
means to deprive the other party of the rights which are otherwise due to him, because the law implies the very truth thus
asserted. We think that no court las ever deliberately sanctioned
such a doctrine, and we are not disposed to set the example.
But it seemas to us that our statute concerning trusts and powers
conclusively settles a part of the case before us. It somewhat
changes the general doctrine previously held, but makes a rule
which is applicable to all the lands which were purchased after
the act came in force. It provides generally that where a conveyance is made to one, the consideration being paid by another,
no trust shall result in favor of the latter if the conveyance was
so taken with his consent, except in certain cases ; and one of
the cases so excepted is when by agreement, without any fraudulent intent, the party to whom the conveyance was made was to
hold the land in trust: 1 G. & H. 651, §§ 6 & 8. It appears by
the evidence that several of the tracts of land were conveyed to
Patrick after this statute took effect,'and there is npthing to taint
the transaction with a fraudulent intent.
We have not considered a question much discussed in the
briefs, whether there was such a partnership between the three
brothers as would subject the estate in these lands to commercial
conditions like personal property, and whether such partnership
contract is within the statute, for the reason that it has seemed to
us unnecessary for the purposes of the present case. It is enough
that the lands were purchased with a common fund, owned in part
by the appellants, and that in consequence a trust in their favor
results. It is argued, however, that the evidence did not disclose
what exact aliquot part of the purchase-money of the lands
belonged to the appellants respectively, and consequently that
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there could have been no verdict for them at any rate. We
cannot say that. There was evidence upon the subject which
would have justified the jury in finding some part of the money
to have been paid by them, and possibly that each paid one-third.
We are not called upon to say what the jury ought to have found
upon that subject. That there was evidence upon it which would
have supported a finding for the appellants in this court, and that
it was excluded from their consideration by the charge of the
court, that "the defendants have failed to sustain their answer,"
constitutes error for which we must reverse the decision below.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.
THE STATE EX REL. JOHN M. PANGBORN ET AL., COMMISSIONERS OF POLICE, v. EDWARD F. C. YOUNG, CITY TREASURER.
THE SAME v. McMANUS.
The copy of a legislative act, certified by the chairman of each house, signed by
the Governor, and filed in the office of the Secretary of State, is the sole and con.
elusive evidence of the existence and contents of a statute.
The journals of the legislative houses are not competent evidence to show that
a copy of a statute, authenticated in the manner above stated, does not contain the
whole of the law as, in point of fact, it was enacted.
It is the province of the legislative department to ctrtify, in its own mode, the
laws it enacis, and such certificate is conclusive on the other co-ordinate departments of the government.
Such also was the rule at common law.

Jacob Tfeart and C. Parker,for the plaintiff.
Winfield & Bradley, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BEASLEY, C. J.-This controversy relates to an act of the legislature passed on the 23d day of March 1866, entitled "An act
to establish a police district in the county of Hudson, and to pro.
vide for the government thereof."
The general purpose of this legislative enactment was to abolish
the ancient system of police, of which the mayor and other muni
cipal authorities of Jersey City had been the organs, and to
transfer the power belonging to that department to a board of
three commissioners to be appointed by the Governor, with the
consent of the Senate of the state. It is not denied that the rela
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tors are the commissioners, duly chosen aud installed into office
under this acti; the defendants being respectively the treasurer
of Jersey City and the chief of police under the old organization.
By the 16th section of the act in question, the commissioners
are authorized to pay all claims arising under its provisions by
checks drawn in a mode which is prescribed, on the treasurer of
Jersey City. Sundry checks have been issued by the board of
commissioners to pay debts by them officially contracted, payment
of.which, when presented, was refused by the treasurer of the
city. This is the transaction which forms the basis of the application for the mandamus in the case first above stated; the
alleged necessity for the mandamus in the second case arises
from the refusal of Mr. McManus, who was the chief of the police
in the old system, to obey the orders of the new board of commissioners, and to deliver to them "the books, papers, and property"
belonging to the police department, according to the requirements of the 23d section of the act above referred to.
Besides certain technical matters which will be noticed hereafter, the defendants have interposed as a defence in both these
cases the objection that the act of the legislature creating the
relators a board of police was not enacted in conformity to the
requirements of the constitution of this state, and on that account
is illegal and altogether void. This allegation is founded in certain facts which, it is alleged, appear upon the journals of the
Senate and House of Assembly. From an inspection of these journals it appears that the act under consideration originated in the
lower house, through which it passed in-.the usual form; that
upon its transfer to the Senate it received in that body certain
important amendments, and in that altered condition was returned
to the Assenqbly, which, concurring in the amendments, adopted
and passed it as in ordinary cases. It is further alleged that
this bill, as modified by the Senate, was never presented to the
Governor for his approval, and is not the bill which has received
the executive sanction, and which is now deposited in the office
of the Secretary of State. It is insisted that by a mistake, which
is not explained, the -bill as it originally passed the House of
Assembly, and before the introduction of amendments by the
Senate, was certified to by the speaker of each house, and is the
act now on file in the office of the Secretary of State, bearing the
signature of the executive. Upon this state of facts it is insisted
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that ti'e amended bill which was adopted by both houses has never
received the approval of the Governor, which, being a constitutional requisite, cannot be dispensed with, and that the bill to
which the Governor's signature is annexed was not the act which,
in point of fact, was passed into a law by the vote of the Senate,
and that as an unavoidable consequence, neither bill is to be
regarded as a legislative act which is enforceable by the courts.
It is not in the least to be doubted that on the assumption of the
truth of these premises, the conclusion thus drawn is correct. A
legislative bill which wanted the approval of either the Assembly
or the Senate, or that of the Governor, would be so plainly defective,
on constitutional grounds, that this court could not hesitate, in
the exercise of its clearly legitimate power, in declaring it absolutely void. Such, indeed, in the argument, was not denied to
be the inevitable result, as an induction of law, if the facts above
stated were to be received and considered by the court. The
entire controversy, and the learned discussion at the bar
which followed, and which has so materially assisted the labors
of the court, turned upon another point, which was, the very important question whether the court, under its admitted power to
inform itself with regard to the existence of the general laws of
the state, was authorized to go behind the copy of a legislative
act on file in the office of the Secretary of State, and which is
authenticated with the usual solemnities. "t will be at once perceived that this is a topic of much delicacy and of great moment,
for it relates to the right of the judiciary to institute its own
modes of inquiring into the action of the legislative department
of the government, as well as to the exercise of its authority,
based upon such an inquiry, to restrain such department within
constitutional limits. The subject has received that careful consideration at the hands of the couirt which was due to a matter
involvin such important legal principles and affecting such high
public interests.
From the foregoing statement it is apparent that the investigation before the court belongs entirely to that branch of legal
science which embraces and illustrates the laws of evidence. The
precise point to be considered is thus advanced in the arguments
of counsel: On the part of the plaintiff it is maintained that the
act as found in the office of the Secretary of State, exemplified
under the great seal, is conclusive evidence of the existence and
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contents of the statute ; while, on the other hand, it is urged,
that when a doubt arises, or is suggested, whether in the passage
of the act, the substantial forms of the constitution have been
observed, the court will satisfy itself on these points by a reference to the journals of the two houses of the legislature. In
order clearly to comprehend these opposing positions it is necessary to understand, with clearness, what the instrument of evidence
is, which, by the one party, is asserted to have the effect to forbid all ulterior inquiry, as well as that other instrument to which,
by the other party, it is insisted the court, under proper circumstances, has the right to revert. First, then, as to the copy of
the act on the files of the office of the Secretary of State.
From the earliest times, so far as I have been able to ascertain,
it has been the invariable course of legislative practice in this
state for the speaker of each house to sign the bill.as finally
engrossed and passed. This bill, thus attested, is then presented
to the Governor, and if approved of by him is authenticated by
his signature.. It is likewise certified by indorsement by the
clerk of the house in which it originated. With these attestations of authenticity upon it, it is then filed in the office of the
Secretary of State. This has been the course of proceeding from
certainly a very remote period to the present time. There seems,
therefore, to be no doubt whatever that these copies, thus authenticated and filed, are-I be regarded as enrolled bills, corresponding in their general character, and partaking, if not in all, at
least in most respects, of the nature of parliamentary rolls. In
the -statute book they are frequently referred to as enrolled bills,
and if we go back to early times we find, indorsed upon these
copies with the executive approval, a direction to enroll themwhich meant nothing more than that they were to be filed. These
are the characteristics and nature of the copies of legislative bills
deposited, according to the ordinary routine, in the office of the
Secretary of State.
Next, then, with regard to the journals of the two houses of the
legislature. Each house keeps one of these memorials by the
express injunction of the constitution. The provision is found in
article iv., § 4, par. 4. Its language is: "Each house shall keep
a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same; and the yeas and nays of the members of either house on
any question, shall at the desire of one-fifth of those present, be
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entered on the journal." And by the last clause of paragraph
6th, in the same section, it is further directed, with regard to the
form of enacting bills, "that the yeas and nays of the members
voting on such final passage shall be entered on the journal."
These are all the constitutional requirements relating to these
diaries ; and it will be observed that with the exception of record
ing the yeas and nays, on certain occasions, there is no prescription in the constitution of what they shall contain. They are not
required to be attested in any way whatever; nor is it said that
they shall even be read over to the house, so that their correctness may stand approved.
From this comparison, it seems to me, it is impossible for the
mind not to incline to the opinion that the framers of the constitution, in enacting the keeping of these journals, did not design
to create records which were to be paramount to all other evidence
with regard to the enactment and contents of laws. At the time
of the formation of the constitution the mode of authenticating
statutes, by a copy enrolled in the office of the Secretary of State,
was completely established by common usage, and by the sanction of its antiquity, and it was also obvious that a copy of an act
thus enrolled was, in every essential particular, almost identical
with a roll of Parliament, which, it was well known, was not only
admissible in evidence but was conclusive as to the existence and
provisions of the law which it embodied. Possessed of this
knowledge, it is difficult to believe that the eminent jurists who,
as delegates, helped to frame the constitution of 1844, meant to
substitute a journal, which was devoid of all the ordinary marks
of authenticity, considered as a means of proof in a court of law,
for a record which in point of evidential efficacy had no superior.
If intended as evidence for any purpose whatever in any course
of judicial investigation, can any one conceive that these registers would have been left in the condition in which, by the constitution, we find them ? In the nature of things they must be
constructed out of loose and hasty memoranda made in the pressure
of business and amid the distractions of a numerous assembly.
There is required not a single guarantee to their accuracy or to
their truth; no one need vouch for them, and it is not enjoined
that they should be either approved, copied, or recorded. It
must be admitted, I think, from these considerations, that a strong
presumption arises that it was not the purpose of those who framed
the constitution, in enjoining each house to keep a journal, to
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establish such journals as the ultimate and conclusive evidence of
the conformity of legislative action to constitutional provisions in
the enactment of laws.
But, independent of this question of intention, as exhibited in
our primary law, the more general inquiry arises,-can the court
resort to this source of inf6rmation to satisfy itself on the point
whether a legislative act has been thus constitutionally passed?
The first consideration which naturally suggests itself, in this
connection, is, that the legislature has with care, and a wise precaution, adopted a mode of certifying its own acts in an authentic
form. And, indeed, so completely has this purpose been effected
that it appears hardly practicable to suggest additional safeguards. To the correctness of the present bill, for example, we
have the signature of the presiding officer of each house. In its
present form it was exhibited to the Governor as the bill which
had been enacted, and as such received his approval, as is evidenced by his signature. It was then immediately made public
by being filed in the office of the Secretary of State. These are
the sanctions which the legislature has provided for the authentication of their own acts, both to the public and to the judicial
tribunals-and the question is therefore presented whether such
authentication must not be deemed conclusive, or, in other words,
whether the legislature does not possess the right of declaring
what shall be the supreme evidence of the authenticity of its own
statutes ? This question, in my opinion, must be answered in the
affirmative. How can it be otherwise ? The body that passes a
law must of necessity promulgate it in some form. In lloint of
fact the legislative power over the certification of its own laws is,
of necessity, almost unlimited, as will appear from the circumstance that with regard to the body of an act there is no evidence
of any kind but that which the legislature itself furnishes in the
copy deposited in the state archives. The journals do not purport to contain more than the amendments, so that the legislative
control is absolute with regard to the essential parts of most of
the laws which are enacted. We.are also to reflect that it is the
power which passes the law which can best determine what the
law is which itself has created. The legislature in this case has
certified to this court, by the hands of its two principal officers,
that the act now before us is the identical statute which they
approved, and, in my opinion, it is not competent for this cour
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to institute an inquiry into the truth of the fact thus solemnly
attested.
Nor do I think this result is to be deprecated. I think the rule
thus adopted accords with public policy. Indeed, in my estimation, few things would be more mischievous than the introduction
of the opposite rule. A little reflection will satisfy most persons
of the truth of this remark. Let us examine the proposition ini
a few words.
The rule contended for is, that the court should look at the
journals of the legislature to ascertain whether the copy of the
act attested and filed with the Secretary of State conforms in its
contents with the statements of such journals. This proposition
means, if it has any legal value whatever, that in the event of a
material discrepancy between the journal and the enrolled copy,
that the former is to be taken as the standard of veracity, and
the act is to be rejected. This is the test which is to be applied
not only to the statute now before the court, but to all statutes;
not only to laws which have been recently passed, but to laws the
most ancient. To my mind nothing can be more certain than that
the acceptance of this doctrine by the court would unsettle the
entire statute law of the state. We have before us some evidence of the little reliability of these legislative journals, to
which, in this place, it is well to advert. This reference should
be premised with the remark that an examination of the journals
alluded to in the evidence revealed the fact they were made up
of entries partly in pencil, partly in ink, and of scraps in print
taken from newspapers. The witness, in the testimony above
mentioned, says: 11I have examined these portions of the Senate
journal -relating to the police bill. With two exceptions they
show the amendments that were added to that bill in the Senate
as it came from the Assembly." "1These amendments having
been agreed to without objection were not inserted in the journal,
it not being usual to insert amendments in the journal except
when the yeas and nays were called, or the hill or amendments
were of some particularimportance." And again, the witness
says: "It is quite an usual thing to dispense with the reading of
the journal in the Senate." Hence it appears that these journals
do not contain amendments not objected to, and which the clerk
deems of little importance, and that in the ordinary course they
are frequently not even'submitted for approval to the body whose
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acts they purport to record. Evidence which would seem less
reliable it is hardly possible to present to -the legal mind; it has
not one of the guarantees, which, even in the most ordinary transactions, are required to raise a presumption in favor of testimony.
Can any one deny that if the laws of the state are to be tested
by a comparison Oith these journals-so imperfect-so unauthenticated-that the stability of all written law will be shaken to its
very foundations ? Certainly no person can venture to say that
many of our statutes, perhaps some of the oldest and most important, those which affect large classes of persons, or on which
great interests depend, will not be found defective, even in constitutional particulars, if judged by this criterion. The misplacing
of a name on a nicely-balanced vote might obviously invalidate
any act: what assurance is there, therefore, that a critical examination of these loosely-kept registers will not reveal many
fatal errors of this description ? In addition to these considerations, in judging of consequences, we are to remember the danger,
under the prevalence of such a doctrine, to be apprehended from
the intentional corruption of evidence of this character. It is
scarcely too much to say that the legal existence of almost every
legislative act would be at the mercy of all persons having access
to these journals, for it is obvious any law can be invalidated by
the interpolation of a few lines, or the obliteration of one name
and the substitution of another in its stead. I cannot consent to
expose the state legislation to the hazards of such probable error
or facile fraud. The doctrine contended for on the part of the
defence has no foundation, in my estimation, in any considerations of public policy.
The principal argument in favor of this judicial appeal from
the enrolled law to the legislative journal, and which was much
pressed in the discussion at the bar, was, that the existence of
this power was necessary to keep the legislature from overstepping the bounds of the constitution. The course of reasoning
urged was, that if the court cannot look at the'facts and examine
the legislative action, that department of government can at will
set at defiance, in the enactment of statutes, the restraints of the
organic law. This argument, however specious, is not solid. The
power thus claimed for the judiciary would be entirely inefficacious as a controlling force over any intentional exorbitance of
the law-making branch of the government. If we may be per-
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mitted, for the purpose of illustration, to suppose the legislature
to design the enactment of a law in violation of the principles of
the constitution, a judicial authority to inspect the journals of
that body would interpose not the slightest barrier against such
transgression, for it is obvious that there could not be the least
difficulty in withholding from such journals every fact evincive
of such transgression. A journal can be no check on the actions
of those who keep it, when a violation of duty is intentional. It
cannot, therefore, fail to be observed how inadequate to the correction of the supposed evil is the proposed remedy. Besides,
if the journal is to be consulted on the ground of the necessity
of judicial intervention, how is it that the inquiry is to stop at
that point? In law, upon ordinary rules, it is plain that a journal is not a record, and is therefore open to be either explained
or contradicted by parol proof. And yet is it not evident that
the court could not, upon the plainest grounds, enter upon such
an investigation ? In the case now in hand, if the offer should be
made to prove, by the testimony of every member of the legislature, that the journals laid before us are false, and that, as a
matter of fact, the enrolled law did receive, in its present form,
the sanction of both houses, no person versed in jurisprudence,
it is presumed, would maintain that such evidence would be competent. The court cannot try issues of fact; nor, with any propriety, could the existence of statutes be made dependent on the
result of such investigations. With regard to matters of fact,
no judicial unity of opinion could be expected, and the consequence would necessarily be that the conclusion of different courts,
as to the legal existence of laws, from the same proofs, would be
often variant, and the same tribunal which to-day declared a
statute void, might to-morrow be compelled, under the effect of
additional evidence, to pronounce in its favor. The notion that
the courts could listen upon this subject to parol proof, is totally
inadmissible; and it therefore unavoidably results, that if the
journal is to be taken into consideration at all, its effect is uncon
trollable: neither its frauds can be exposed nor its errors corrected. And if this be so, and the journal is to limit the inquiry
of the judicial power, how obvious the inadequacy, if not futility
of such inquiry. In my estimation the doctrine in question, if
entertained, would, as against legislative encroachments, be useless
as a guard to the constitution, and it certainly would be attended
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with many evils.
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Its practical application would be full of embarrassment. If the courts, in order to test the validity of a
statute, are to draw the comparison between the enrolled copy of
an act and the entries on the legislative journal, how great, to
have the effect' of exploding the act, must be the discrepancy
-between the two? Will the omission of any provision, no matter
how unimportant, have that effect? The difficulty of a satisfactory answer to these and similar interrogatories is too apparent
to need comment. And again, to notice one among the many
practical difficulties which suggest themselves, what is to be the
extent of the application of this doctrine ? If an enrolled statute
of this state does not carry within itself conclusive evidence of
its own authenticity, it would seem that the same principle must
be extended to the statutes, however authenticated, of other
states. An act, therefore, of Virginia or California, with regard
to the mode of its enactment, would be open to trial as a matter
in paia. And indeed the doctrine, if carried to its legitimate
conclusion, would seem to abolish altogether the conclusiveness
even of international authentications-for if the great seal of
this state, attesting the existence of a statute is not final, it is
not perceived how a greater efficacy is to be given to the seal of
a foreign government.
In addition to the foregoing observations, I cannot close this
part of my examination of the question under discussion without
adverting to a further consideration which, to my mind, appears
to be entitled to very great if not decisive weight. I here allude
to. the circumstance that in the structure of the government of this
state, the judicial and legislative departments are made co-equal,
and that it nowhere appears that the one has the right of supervision over the other. It is true, as was much pressed on the
argument, that the legislative branch may wilfully infringe constitutional prescriptions. But the capacity to abuse power is a
defect inherent in every scheme of human government, and yet,
nevertheless, the forces of government must be reposed in some
hands. The prerogatives to make, to execute, and to expound
the laws must reside somewhere. Depositaries of these great
national trusts must be found, though it is certain th at such depositaries may betray the confidence thus reposed in them. In the
frame of our state government the recipients and organs of this
threefold power are the legislature, the executive, and judiciary,
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and they are co-ordinate-in all things equal and independent.
Each within its sphere is the trusted agent of the public. With
what propriety then is it claimed that the judicial branch can
erect itself into the custodian of the good faith of the legislative
d'epartment? It is to be borne in mind that the point now
touched does not relate to the capacity to pronounce a law which
it admitted to have been enacted, void by reason of its unconsti
tutionality: that is clearly a function of judicature. But the
proposition is, whether when the legislature has certified to a
mere matter of fact relating to its own conduct, and within its
own cognisance, the courts of the state are at liberty to inquire
into or dispute the veracity of that certificate? I can discover
nothing in the provisions of the constitution, or in the general principles of government, which will justify the assumption of such
superior authority. In my opinion the power to certify to the
public the laws itself has enacted, is one of the trusts of the con.
stitution to the legislature of the state.
Neither do I think, if we turn from these general considerations
to regard judicial sentiment and the authority of decided cases,
that we are led to any other conclusion than the one above
expressed. A brief reference to a few of the more important of
the decisions will, I think, justify this opinion.
In England the legal principle upon the point now presented
for the first time to this court, appears to have been entirely at
rest from an early day. The leading case in that country is that
of Bex v. Arundel, reported by Lord HOBART, p. 110; and
the remarkable similarity between the question involved in the
controversy there reported and the one now before us for decision
should not escape observation. The facts were the following, viz. :
It appeared that a bill had passed the upper House by the consent of the Lords, and had been sent to the lower House, and
from thence had been returned with a certain proviso annexed to
it. This bill was filed with the rest of the bills, and was marked
with the royal assent. As this was a private bill it was not
enrolled in the Court of Chancery, as was the usage with acts
of a public nature. The attempt on the trial in the Court of
Chancery was to show by the journal of the upper House that
the proviso which was omitted in the copy filed had been passed
as a part of the bill. Then, as in the principal case, the question
was upon the point of the admissibility of the parliamentary
VOL. XIV.--44
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journal to impeach the bill on the files, on the ground that the
latter did not contain all the provisions which had received the
sanction of one of the Houses ; but the court resolved that the
journal could not be used as evidence for that purpose. And the
distinction is drawn, in the clearest manner, between an infirmity
appearing in the act itself, as where it purported to have been
passed without the concurrence of the Commons, and a defect
revealed only by the journal; the former being regarded as an
incurable imperfection; the latter, as an objection impossible,
according to the laws of evidence, to be proved. This doctrine,
which is founded on the still earlier decisions reported in the
Year-Books, has been, I am satisfied, the undisputed law of the
English courts from that day to the present. It has received the
sanction of Lord COKE (the case of heresy, 12 Rep. 58), and the
principle was carried so far by Lord HALE, that in a case where
the defendant pleaded that a bill wanted the royal assent, he
would not permit the question to be raised, but held that the
certificate of the bill from the Court of Chancery, where it had
been recorded, was conclusive: College qf Piysicians and
Cooper v. Herbert, 3 Keb. 587. Nor can it I think be denied
that a statute properly attested by seal, everywhere in the common law, is regarded as a method of evidence, equal and equivalent to the copy of a judgment formally exemplified. They each
import'absoluta verity; to neither can the plea of nul tiel record
be applied; their existence and contents can be tried only by
inspection. No English judge, as far as I am aware, has ever
dropped a hint that as an instrument of evidence a statute does
not stand on the same level with a judgment. I think all persons
must admit that this is the rule of the common law. How is it
then that this court is to dispense itself from the enforcement of
,his rule, so clearly established and so ancient. But one suggestion in this respect was made by counsel, and that was that
the English rule was not applicable to the present condition of
affairs here, growing out of the written constitution of this state.
But I cannot perceive the force of this argument. The constitution of this state, it is true, requires each house of the legislature
to keep a journal of its proceedings; but, as already remarked,
neither by expression nor by implication is such journal made
evidence in so supreme a degree that it can be used to annul or
impeach a record. Besides, by prescription and immemorial
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usage, journals of its proceedings are kept by Parliament, and
which, for certain purposes, have always been recognised by the
courts, and there seems to be no reason whatever to hold that,
considered as means of proof in any court of law, such journals
occupy a rank inferior to those which are kept by the legislature
under the direction of the constitution of this state. I see nothing
in this particular which will prevent the application of the rule
of the common law to this case. Nor do I think there is anything
which will produce a different result in the fact that in this state
the legislature is constrained to enact laws in the modes marked
out in a written constitution. The Parliament of England is not
possessed of arbitrary powers ; it is as incapable as our own legislature of passing a law except in a certain definite and prescribed
form. A statute which bad not received the approval of either
house, or of the executive, would be void alike in Great Britain
and in this. state. The difference is simply between restrictions
upon the law-making power established by usage and those committed to writing; a difference which does not seem to affect, in
any substantial manner, the question of evidence now considered.
The same common-law principle which gives the quality of conclusiveness to a parliamentary roll, must therefore, as a part of
the unquestionable law of this state, and which this court has no
choice but to enforce, impart the same force to an enrolled act of
the legislature of this state.
My general conclusion then is, that both upon the grounds of
public policy and upon the ancient and well-settled rules of law,
the copy of a bill attested in the manner above mentioned, and
filed in the office of the Secretary of State, is the conclusive
proof of the enactment and contents of a statute of this state ; and
that such attested copy cannot be contradicted by the legislative
journal, or in any other mode.
In conformity with the foregoing view I regard the decided
weight of American authority. It is. not deemed necessary to
review the cases. The following will be found to support substantially the conclusion above expressed: The Pacific Railroad
Co. v. The Governor, 23 Missouri 353; Fouke v. Fleming, 13
Md. 412; lDuncombe v. Prindle, 12 Iowa 1; Peo v. Purdy, 2
Hill 31; s. c. 4 Id. 384; Eld v. qorham, 20 Conn.
On the argument of these cases the further ground was assumed
that neither of them was of such a character as to warrant the
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use of the writ of mandamus. But the court cannot concur in
this view. In the one case the writ is asked to compel the chief
of police to submit to the authority of the board of commissioners,
and to deliver up to them certain property to which, by force of
the statute, they are entitled; and in the other case the intervention of this court is sought to require the city treasurer to honor
the drafts of the commissioners, in obedience to the same law. In
such case the application is to this court for its prerogative writ
to constrain a public officer to discharge a duty incident to his
office, which is in no degree discretionary, and for the breach of
which there is no other specific or adequate remedy. Each case
appears to come clearly within the office of the mandamus: 8
Mod. 28 ; Bac. Abr. tit. Man. C. D.; Rex v. Buller, 8 East
388; Rex v. Gravesend, 2 B. & 0. 602.
Let the writs issue according to the application.

Circuit Court of the United States. Fourth Circuit, District
of Maryland.
OWNERS OF THE MARY WASHINGTON v. AYRES etal.
The duty of a carrier by water is not fulfilled by simple transportation from port
to port. The goods must be landed and the consignee notified of their arrival.
Where goods were landed from a vessel and stored in the carrier's storehouse
until the consignee should call for them, but no notice of their arrival was given
him, proof that such was the carrier's general custom will not relieve him from
liability for damage to the goods after such storage, unless there is proof of agreement by the owners to such arrangement.
A contract of affreightment to be performed upon tidal waters or navigable rivers
wholly within the limits of a state, is a maritime contract within the admiralty
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.

from the District Court in Admiralty.
The appellants, who ware respondents below, agreed with the
appellees, who were libellants, for certain compensation which
was paid, to convey on their steamer certain merchandise from
Baltimore to Hill's Landing, on the Patuxent river, and to deliver
it there to Pumphrey. The merchandise was accordingly conveyed to respondents' wharf, at Hill's Landing, and Pumphrey
not being there to receive it, was placed in their warehouse connected with the wharf. This warehouse was kept for the accomAPPEAL
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modation of the carrying trade in which the steamer was employed.
Goods landed for delivery were temporarily placed in it when
immediate and direct delivery was impracticable or inconvenient;
and goods received for shipment were in like manner accommodated, when immediate shipment could not be made. No charge
was made for the accommodation. It was an incident to the
trade, and paid for in the freight. The goods in the present case
were damaged after being stored in this warehouse.
The judgment of the District Court was for the libellants;
whereupon the respondents appealed to this court.
William Pinkney Iiykte, for libellants.
P. I. Crain and Wi. M. Addison, for respondents.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CHASE, C. J.-Under the circumstances of this case I think that
the contract of affreightment bound the carriers not only to carry
the merchandise to the landing, but to deliver it to Pumphrey,
or excuse non-delivery by proof of equivalent action or waiver.
The duty of a carrier by water is not fulfilled by simple transportation from port to port. The goods must be delivered, or at
least landed, and a reasonable opportunity given to the consignee
of ascertaining their condition. In order that opportunity for
inspection and for the removal of the goods may be given, the
consignee must be notified of the arrival of the goods. This is
the general rule. If exceptions are made by usage, circumstances, or special arrangements, they must be shown by proof.
In the present case the respondents allege that it was not their
practice to give notice to consignees, but instead of giving such
notice, to deposit goods in their warehouse, where the consignees
were expected to call for them, on learning from their correspondents, or otherwise, of their arrival. They insist that this arrangement was for the benefit of the owners of the goods, and was
understood and agreed to by them. The evidence does not sustain this claim. It shows, clearly enough, the practice of the
respondents ; but it does not show any understanding, on the part
of the owners of the goods, that the respondents were to be
relieved from their responsibility as carriers until its actual delivery, or its equivalent deposit in their warehouse, with information conveyed to the owners, in some way, that their goods had
arrived. The warehouse arrangement was rather for the con-
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venience of the carriers than of freighters or consignees. The
storage, with information of arrival, however obtained, may be
regarded properly enough as a substitute for actual and direct
notice, and it may be admitted that opportunity for removal, after
such information, would discharge the carriers from responsibility
as such, in the same manner as actual notice and like opportunity.
But to hold that mere deposit in their own warehouse, under the
circumstances of this case, terminated their special responsibility,
would be a dangerous relaxation of the salutary rule on which
the security of commerce so largely depends.
It is clear, from the proof, that the nerchandise was damaged
after the landing, and while in the custody of respondents, before
Pumphrey had information of its arrival, or opportunity to take
it away. It seems, however, that the merchandise was not ordered
from the libellants by Pumphrey, and that he declined to receive
it, and it is alleged that the carriers, therefore, were not liable.
And there was proof that no order for the merchandise was actually given, and that Pumphrey, on learning its condition, refused
to have anything to do with it. But it is not easy to perceive
the importance of this circumstance. It is plain enough that the
libellants acted in -good faith upon an expectation founded on a
conversation with Pumphrey, that he would like to have the merchandise sent to him, and that he would receive and pay for it,
if of good quality and in good condition, and the proofs show
that this expectation was warranted. Whether warranted or not,
the duty of the carriers was in no way affected. Their obligation, both to shippers and consignees, was to convey and deliver,
or at least offer to deliver safely. It is true that after Pumphrey
had information of arrival, and declined to receive the merchandise because of its bad condition, the respondents could not be
held responsible as carriers, to the libellants, for subsequent injuries in the warehouse ; but their responsibility for prior injuries
was not changed, and it is that responsibility only which is now
in controversy.
In the present case the question whether the respondents werc
liable as common carriers or as warehousemen is of little import
ance, except as a question of jurisdiction. The proof shows a
degree of negligence which would make them liable in either
character. But if their liability were as warehousemen only, they
would not be responsible in this court. A court of the Union
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has in general no jurisdiction of suits against warehousemen by
citizens of the same state. Remedies for violation of these contracts must be sought by their co-citizens in state courts.
It is not questioned, however, that the judicial power of the
United States extends to all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction. This is a provision of the National Constitution.
Nor is it questiu-ed that this whole jurisdiction is vested by law
in the District Courts of the United States, and on appeal in the
Circuit Courts. This was expressly enacted by Congress in 1789.
Nor is it questioned that a contract of affreightment, to be performed by traversing tide-waters, or other navigable waters, is in
general a maritime contract, or that a suit upon such a contract
makes a case of admiralty jurisdiction. This is settled by repeated
decisions. But it is insisted that the contract of affreightment
in this case was to be performed wholly within the state of Maryland, and that this case, therefore, having arisen from an alleged
breach of it, is not within the admiralty jurisdiction. Upon this
I remark, in the first place, that there is nothing in the nature or
history of admiralty jurisdiction which excludes from its cognisance contracts to be performed within the country or state in
which it is exercised. On the contrary, such contracts, if maritime in their character, were constantly held before the organization of the Union to be proper subjects of that jurisdiction.
Within a comparatively recent period, however, doubts have
been expressed whether such contracts can be enforced by national
courts sitting in admiralty. Such doubts were expressed in 1848
by Justice NELSON, speaking for a majority of the justices of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of The New
Jersey Steam Navigation Company v. The JMerchants' Bank, 6
How. 392. They were founded on the assumption that "the
exclusive jurisdiction in admiralty cases was conferred on the
National Government as closely connected with the grant of commercial power," and were cautiously stated as follows: "It is a
maritime court, instituted for the purpose of administering the
law of the seas. There seems to be ground, therefore, for restrain
ing its jurisdiction, in some measure, within the limit of the commercial power, which would confine it, in cases of contracts, to
those concerning the navigation and trade of the country upon
the high seas and tide-waters with foreign countries, and among
the several states. Contracts growing out of the purely internal

OWNERS OF MARY WASHINGTON v. AYRES.

commerce of the state, as well as commerce beyond tide-waters,
are generally domestic in their origin and operation, and could
scarcely have been intended to be drawn within the cognisance
of the Federal courts."
The principle thus intimated rather than asserted was applied
ten years later in the case of Allen v. Newberry, 21 How. 244,
to a contract of affreightment to be performed on Lake Michigan,
between two ports in Wisconsin; but the decision against the
jurisdiction over the contract was placed quite as much upon the
Act of Congress of February 26th 1845, which restricts admiralty
jurisdiction on the lakes and interior navigable waters to contracts relating to vessels employed between ports in the different
states, as upon the more general restriction derived from the
limitation of the eommercial power.
It cannot escape observation that this denial of jurisdiction to
the national courts of affreightment-contracts to be performed
between ports of the same state, but on navigable waters where,
in cases of tort, the admiralty jurisdiction is undoubted, rests
wholly upon the assumption that the restriction upon the commercial power operates as a constitutional limitation of the jurisdiction in admiralty over contracts.
Now, without more than a mere reference to the difficulty of
assigning a reason for such a limitation of that jurisdiction in
matters of contract which would not require the like limitation in
matters of tort, and to the admitted doctrine that in matters of
tort no such limitation exists, it is proper to observe that it has
been more than once distinctly denied by the Supreme Court that
any inference whatever in respect to the jurisdiction in admiralty
can be drawn from the constitutional provision concerning commerce. Thus in the case of The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 452,
the late Chief Justice, speaking for the court, and speaking with
special reference to admiralty jurisdiction, said: 1 Nor can the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States be made to depend
on regulations of commerce. They are entirely distinct things,
having no necessary connection with one another, and are conferred in the constitution by separate and distinct grants."
So, too, in the case of The Propeller Commerce, 1 Black 578,
in 1861, the Supreme Court, noticing an objection to its jurisdiction on the ground that it did not appear that the propeller was
engaged in foreign commerce, or in commerce between the states,

